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The political crime is perhaps the oldest of all
crime-types. It is virtually impossible to find a
history of any society which does not record
political criminals. They have always existed, they
exist now, and they will exist in the future, in spite
of the historical experience that the ideal behind
the political crime is often destroyed the moment
it becomes reality. Although political crime is the
oldest and most recurring criminal phenomenon of
history, it has been largely ignored by criminologists. It has been considered merely a criminological satellite, a strange body of law violations revolving around the concept of ordinary crimes.
This neglect of political crimes by criminologists
and other social scientists is all the more surprising
because the available data are quite extensive and
there are no peculiar difficulties in attempting to
analyze them. If we view only contemporary
twentieth-century history, the most profound
changes we find are political. The rise and fall of
empires, charismatic leaders, races, classes and
social systems have been the dominant features of
these changes, and almost without exception these
changes involved political crimes. It may be that
the overly behavioral approach of contemporary
criminology has been more interested in the expressions and results of conduct than in the conduct itself. Furthermore, any analysis of political
criminals might be facilitated by a finding that
most of them seem to exhibit common elements.
Political criminals may generally be termed methodological kleptomaniacs who steal style from one
another. Acknowledged by writers in the past as
the passionate offenders, the political criminals of
our time are simply technologically modern criminals wearing the cloak of old age.
As the problem of political crime becomes more
topical, it is difficult to feel anything except disquietude at experiencing so many revolutions, upheavals, and violet social movements. Yet this dis* J.D., 1933; Professeur Agr~gd, 1947; Professor of
Sociology and Criminology, Northeastern University.

quiet stems not from resistance to a better future,
but rather from the confusion engendered by the
variegated and contradictory proposals for new
political structures. While political crimes have
often been the most powerful forces shaping human
societies, we are living in an age in which the
abuses of political criminality come more naturally
to us than its uses. Gustave Le Bon's vision of the
leader manipulating the crowd was quite prophetic
of the twentieth century. The popular use of the
term "restructuring" has become mixed up with
the idea of revolutionary alterations in society, and
is far removed from the true concern for structuring. In our time, the complaint that politics is being
criminalized might be coupled with the experience
that criminality is being politicized. Thus, the real
problem of the concept of the political criminal is
the invasion of pseudo-political criminals into the
arena where beneficial social changes are forcibly
attempted through violations of the law.
THE RELATIVITY OF POLITICAL CRmIS
In the broadest sense, it may be argued that all
crimes are political crimes inasmuch as all prohibitions with penal sanctions represent the defense
of a given value system or morality, in which the
prevailing social power believes. In the Soviet system, for example, crime is a "social danger"meaning the harm, risk, or peril to which the political and economic institutions, as the representatives of the prevailing ideology, are exposed. Taking
this ad absurdum, even a bank robbery, a shoplifting, or a rape is a political crine. After all,
making them criminal offenses protects the interests and rights of the law-making power, which
regards them as right and worthy of safeguarding
with the threat of penal consequences.' Yet it is
customary to distinguish between political and
ordinary crimes, because their actual content and
I similar stand was taken in M. PAmm=LEE, CRIINOLOGy 92 (1918). See also T. SELLIN, CULTURE CON-

icIT AND CR=r (1938) ("culture conflict" theory).
The Soviet concept of "social danger" strongly leans
toward such an understanding.
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context are different and distinctly recognizable,
despite the similarities in their structures.
For both ordinary and political crime it can be
said that "law is formal expression of the value
system of the prevailing social power," 2 that mancommitted crime is dependent upon the man-made
law, and that as long as the existing social power
prevails, its moral system is "right" and must not
be attacked beyond certain limits. However, the
role of this value system or morality is far more
apparent in political crimes than it is in ordinary
crimes. Since by definition the "conservatives"
tend to conserve the prevailing social-political
power structure with its values and morality, the
"radicals" are usually the political criminals. The
political stance of ordinary criminals is generally
unrecognizable and irrelevant. Havelock Ellis suggested that the word "criminal" in the expression
"political criminal" is a euphemism to express the
suppression of a small minority by the majority 4.
And while Hugo Grotius cited Tertullian for the
proposition that every man is from his birth a
soldier with a mission to combat criminals guilty of
treason, Louis Proal, a judge of the Court of
Appeals at Aix, cited the anarchist Valliant, who
proposed that the citizen has the same rights when
acting in self-defense against the tyrant or against
an enemy. 5 The real questions are who the "radicals" and "anarchists" are, who the "conservatives" are, and which of them and in what circumstances are "political criminals." Such questions
inevitably lead to the problem of the relativity of
law and crime, and thus, to the riddle of relativity
in the concept of political crime, a characteristic
that is only occasionally conspicdous in ordinary
crimes. Ultimately, these questions guide us to the
understanding of man as a multidimensional being,
whose consciousness, morality, and freedom can be
approached from different points of view, none of
which can claim to be the only legitimate one. 6
Such considerations led Havelock Ellis to suggest that the word "crime" in the term "political
IS. SCHAFER, THEORmEs IN CRIMINOLOGY: PAST AND
PRESENT PHILOSOPHIES OF THE CRIME PROBLEM 17
(1969).
3Id.at 14.

4H. ELLIS, THE CanaNAL 2 (5th ed. no date).
6L. PRoAL, PoLrrincAL CRnm 50-51 (1898) (originally published as LA Can ALIrr
f BoLITIQuQ (1895)).
To regard the state as criminal and the members of the
society as victims is, philosophically, a highly controversial contention that leads to the problem of the
natural law and to the assumption that there exists
only a single morality.
6See SCHAFER, supra note 2, at 11. See generally P.

BowEs, CoNscIousNEss AND FREEDOM (1971).

criminal" is "an abuse of language." Ellis contended that just as the concept of heresy is necessary to ensure the supremacy of a Church, the
concept of the political criminal is necessary to
ensure the supremacy of a government. The political criminal of our time may be the hero, martyr,
or saint of another age A monarch, for example,
is the incarnate personification of conservatism,
yet, as Parmelee pointed out, Charles the First in
England and Louis the Sixteenth in France were
beheaded as political criminals. And, although
"there is perhaps nothing in human culture more
archaic than religion," the clergy were proscribed
as criminals during the French Revolution.8 The
Hungarian Revolution offers a modem example of
abrupt and rapid changes in the norm-making
power structure. At the time of the revolution in
1956, criminals turned into heroes and then back
into criminals, while law-abiding citizens changed
to criminals and then back to conformists-all
within eight days.
In defense of Macaulay, Chesterton wrote:
All reputations, except those of the utterly imbecile, dwindle and rise again; capable men are
praised twice, first for the wrong reasons and
then, after a cycle of obloquy, for the right.
His remarks describe not only the careers of some
authors and scholars, but also the careers of some
political criminals. The changing concept of political crime and its moral base, however, cannot
secure asylum for all those who take a law-breaking stand against the prevailing power and its
value system. History gives its approval only in
the future and only for exceptional political
criminals. While the guilt of the political criminal
is usually established by the courts of justice at
the time of the act, he is frequently acquitted only
by the writers of history centuries later. To be
elevated to sainthood takes time.
However, the centuries required to see a candidate successfully through to sainthood often exhausts the time and money of the sponsors, while
the political criminal's generation oftentimes witnessing only an abortive proposal of social change,
can see him only as a guilty man. Before the cosmetic of political history labels his defeat as unjust, he is unavoidably subject to the Austinian
"command of the sovereign," 9 since all laws are
7
ELLis, supra note 4, at 1-2.
8 PAMELEE,supra note 1, at 461.
9
J. Ausn. LEcTuREs ON JuRiSPRUDENCE OF THE
PHIosoPHY OF PosiTIVE LAW (1861).
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formulated on the unspoken assumption that they
represent the "right" value-system, even though
they may not appear so to all members of society.' °
All aspiring political criminals must learn that laws
are "just" insofar as they are defined by the ruling
social power and so long as the existing social
power prevails. The social power, not the political
criminal, dictates what is "right" and "wrong,"
and in the form of commands raises the law to the
level of "truth."
Cicero told the story of a captured pirate who
defended himself before Alexander the Great by
saying that he did exactly what the great tonqueror had done, but that he was to be punished
as a pirate rather than a conqueror simply because
he operated with one small boat instead of a large
armada." The case of the pirate, however, is deceptively simple. The question of who or what has
the power to declare what is right is an ancient
problem that has been studied by jurists as well as
by sociologists. Perhaps one of the reasons for the
long-standing inability to find an answer is that
lawyers are too close to the problem and sociologists too distant from it, and both seem reluctant
to meet in the domain of legal philosophy or in
what is called the sociology of law. Indeed, there
is much more involved in the idea of law than
sheer obedience. Usually, a rich and complex
interplay between individuals, groups, and conflicting values takes place before a law is created.
Yet ultimately, to use Herbert Hart's term, a
penal statute declaring certain conduct criminal
"may appear to be the gunman situation writ
large." 12 John Austin's claim that the law is the
command of the sovereign may well be a terrifying truth which offers little shelter for those who
abandon the real world for the comfort of illusions.u
The greatest obstacle to understanding this tenet
is our reluctance to accept the fact that what we
consider right does not necessarily represent the
only correct view. We tend to think there is a
single immutable truth and conclude, therefore,
that there is only one possible system of justice.
The claim that the social system and its law are
moral or ethical rests upon the dubious hypothesis
that there is only one normal, ethical code. The
political criminal gets involved in law-breaking by
professing that his is the only just or right set of
10SCHAPER, supra note 2, at 89.
"13 CicEno, DE REPuBLicA 12.
12
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 6-7
supra note 2, at 11.
IsSc a.,

(1961).
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values. But the cruel fact is that the social-political power has sole authority to define values. It
conclusively defines the rightness or wrongness of
the modes of human conduct. Whatever is defined
by this social power as right or wrong must be
accepted by those who are required to obey, as
long as that power prevails. The relativity of the
concept of the political criminal rests with this
relativity of the social power.
THE PLACE or

POLITICAL CRIME AMONG THE
CLASSES OF CRIMES

The relative nature of the political crime is one
of the major reasons for the rather hesitant and
divergent approaches to the concept of the political criminal and his placement among criminal
types. Even in the field of interjurisdictional cooperation, where the problem of how to exempt
political criminals from extradition often arises,
international treaties cautiously avoid the political
criminal concept in most cases. Wherever "political crime" is defined in agreements between sovereign powers, it is generally couched in objective
references to treason, conspiracy, mutiny and felonies commited against heads of states. Many
analysts of the issue of extradition see in the concept of political crime a kind of supra-legal category which can be defined only as the analogue of
the interests of any given political power, and is
therefore beyond the descriptive ability of the law.
Carrara, for instance, has simply labeled it "indefinable." 14 Others who have attempted to define
political crimes, either objectively or subjectively,
have supplied the literature on international extradition with hundreds of definitions, most of which
were directed at serving interjurisdictional purposes.' 1
Outside the sphere of international criminal law,
particularly in sociological criminology, only a few
scattered scholars have regarded the political crim14F. CAREA, PRoG -MmA
3916-39 (6th ed. 1886).
"Objectivized definitions have been attempted by:
Bluntschli, Brusa, Carmignani, Crivellari, DeVigne,
Fabreguettes, Finger, Fiore, Garraud, Gerland, Grivaz,
Haus, Helie, Holtzendorff, Homberger, Kleinschrod,
K61hler, von Liszt, L6wenfeld, Martens, Martitz,
Mecacci, Meyer-Allfeld, Mittermaier, Mohl, Ortolan,
Prins, Pravo-Kluit, Renault, Rossi, Schiattarella,
Schirach, Teichman, Trasimeni and Andr6 Weiss.
Subjectivized or motivational type descriptions have
been attempted by:
von Bar, Billot, Dalloz, Deloume, Glaser, Georgi,
Helie, Lammasch and Soldan.
See G. Rkcz, A. PoLrrmm BiiNTErEsEx M xENDnkJoG AAX KRITIxLJA 25 (1932); U. Conti, Sid
Deillo Bolitico, 100 RIwsTA PENALE 8.
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inal as worthy of interest. Even these scholars
have seemed to confine themselves to the analysis
of violence and other behavior patterns which accompany political crimes. The reports of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention
of Violence, for example, devoted several thousand
pages to the many facets of violence in America,
but despite the fact that most of these discussions
emphasized that violent crimes were of a political
character, the general problems of political crimes
and the concept of the politic~il criminal were
nowhere considered. Although political crime as a
crime-type is alluded to in most of the contemporary textbooks of criminology, it is only treated
obliquely. Even in the few treatises which deal
with the subject more extensively, the discussion
is confined to outwardly observable behavioral
expressions. In this vein, Marshall B. Clinard and
Richard Quinney refer only to the actual "violations which occur in the course of the attempt to
protest, express beliefs about, or alter in some way
the existing social structure." Nevertheless, they
do broaden their view somewhat by including
police brutality and other activities of public
officeholders within the concept of political crime,
intimating that those in power can commit political crimes.16 Similarly, among the classical authors,
Louis Proal has postulated a broadened view of
political crimes. Included in his definition are
criminal offenses which are committed in the
course of political activities, such as theft from
public funds, corrupting police officers, or misuse of
power by officials. 7 Although these expanded
views may appear to deny the relativity of political
crimes, they do seem to extend the concept to what
may be termed pseudo-political criminal acts.
Franklin H. Giddings, who introduced the English translation of Proal's book, took a different
approach in defining the political criminal. Although Giddings did not exclude offenses committed by governments and politicians for political
advantage, he emphasized the fact that only the
"powerless" can commit genuine political crimes.
He refers primarily to crimes against governments,
such as treason, insurrection, and rebellion, but he
defines the concept of the political criminal according to crimes, not classes of criminals.8

Cesare Lombroso was among the first to pay
attention not only to the criminal act, but also to
the criminal man. His typology dealt more with
political crimes than with political criminals. He
listed the political criminals as a subgroup in the
class of "criminals by passion" and contended that
whatever is true of the passionate criminal may be
said of the political criminal." Lombroso suggested
that criminals by passion are characterized by a
high degree of affectivity, so that in unusual and
strained circumstances, they develop a passion that
leads to violent crimes. While not all criminals by
passion are political criminals, all political criminals are criminals by passion.
Lombroso believed in the passion of political
criminals so strongly that he charged the passionless political criminals with insanity. Referring to
passionless political criminals as persons who "need
the hospital more than the scaffold," Lombroso
actually proposed their deportation. His fancy, as
with Ferri's notion of "social danger," has become
a reality in our time. The Soviet system, although
perhaps not within the Lombrosian import, established mental clinics for political prisoners "who
moralize too much" or have "reformist ideas." 20
Lombroso's contention, however, is not in accord with other concepts of the political criminal.
Havelock Ellis, for one, clearly distinguished political criminals from criminals with passion. Although Maurice Parmelee suggested that "insanity of different sorts and other forms of mental
morbidity are more or less prevalent among these
criminals," he found only slight differences between the pathological and emotional types, observing that "rational" political criminals are "by
far the least numerous." 22 Willem Bonger severely
criticized Lombroso's stand, suggesting that "it
23
is full of mistakes and superficial observations."
Nevertheless, it should be recognized that Lombroso hinted at the function of emotions, a dimension which had been neglected by many philosophers. And perhaps the theme of the political
crime is emphasized through the role of emotions,

11M. CrmrAD & R. QumNxY. CRnrmIL BEHAVIOR
SYsTeus: A TYPOLOGY 177-87 (1967). Their selected
bibliography extends only to the last thirty years and
includes
only American references. See id. at 187-89.
17
See generally PRoAL.
18Giddings, Introduction to id. at v-xiv.

Mental Clinics for Political Prisoners,The Manchester Guardian Weekly, April 3, 1971 at 5.
2 ELis, supranote 4, at 2.
" PARmELx, supra note 1, at 462-46.

19C. LomBRoso, CR=E, ITS CAusEs AND REmEDixs
412-14 (1918); R. LAscm, LE Cxam PoI=nQuE ET
LES RMVO-UTIONS (1892) (originally published as IL
DELrrTO PoLiTico F LE

rvoLuzlONI IN RAPPoRTo AL
ALL ANTROPOLOGIA CRMqnALE ED ALLA
SCIENZA
Di GovERNo.
20

Dxrro,

13W.A.

BONGER,

CRMINALTY

CoNrmONs 648 (1916).

AND
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both as an action-motivating power and as an
expression of the language of values and morality.
Unlike Lombroso, Raffaele Garofalo seemed hesitant to include political crimes in his "natural
crime" concept:
How are we to contend that conspiracy or rebellion
aagainst a lawful government is not a true crime?
Can there be anything more dangerous to the particu24
lar society?
However, Garofalo raised the question of the
sympathy which political offenders often receive
from even their bitterest enemies and suggested
that political crimes do not "violate the altruistic
sentiments." 25 A somewhat similar stand was
taken by Enrico Ferri. While he was arguing with
Napoleone Colajanni, who advocated political
crime as an independent category, 26 Ferri contended that the political offenders are not criminals, but are "honest and normal men misguided
by their political ideas." 27 He called them "evolutive" or "politico-social" criminals, who tend "in
a more or less illusory way to hasten the future
phases of politico-social life." 21 In the same vein,
Maxwell contrasted the "retrograde" criminals
with those wo are "antrograde" offenders, defining "ant~rograde" offenders as those who find
social evolution too slow. 29
Maurice Parmelee viewed the concept of the
political criminal as a confrontation between the
government and those who are against its polity
"in interest of the public." 0 Havelock Ellis, however, called them victims of an "attempt by a
more or less despotic government to preserve its
own stability." 31 And even Willem Bonger contended that the political criminal acts "for the
benefit of society," for "the opporessed classes, and
consequently [for] all humanity." Faithful to
his general approach to the crime problem, Bonger
maintained that the political criminal was a
"homo nobilis" who reflected economic conditions.n
24

R. GARorALo, CRrOINOLOGY 37 (1914).
at 37, 217.
2161 N. Co.AjANI, SOCIOLOGIA CRimNALE 352
(1889).
2 E. FERRI, CxrDmonA SocIoLoGY 163 (1917).
21Id. at 335.
2J. MAxwELL, LE CoNCEPT SocIAL DU CRn
52
(1914).
30
PuRu E=z, supra note 1, at 454.
3,
3 Euis, supra note 4, at 1.
2BONGER, supra note 23, at 648-55.
21 Id.
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THE "CoNVICTIONAL" CPMIINAL AND
His Dirn.
As an attempt to reconcile and correct the
different conceptions of the political criminal,
considering mainly those which call attention to
his passion and strong feelings for society, the
term "convictional" criminal is here proposed" to
underscore the fact that morality and value systems are pluralistic ideas and that the political
criminal is "convinced" about the truth and
justification of his own altruistic beliefs. This element of "conviction" speaks to the settled belief
in the conscience of the political criminal which
makes him feel that he has a rendezvous with
destiny. Conviction serves as a distinguishing
factor in discriminating political criminals from
ordinary offenders, as well as from the pseudoconvictional criminals who do not really differ
from ordinary criminals. The political criminal may
be "convinced," for example, that it is not "lawful to kill in order to secure the triumph of a
cause," 4 but he will proceed to disregard the law
nonetheless.
In contrast with the convictional criminal, the
conventional offender almost always acts to fulfill
his ego or his personal interest, and his acts often
lack an overarching significance.85 Although the
occasional criminal may steal a loaf of bread when
hungry, shoplift a golden ring if overcome by desire, or kill another out of jealousy, it is his hunger,
his desire, or his quality of emotion against his
rival which drives him to act. He must be stimulated by personal need, wish, or agitation of mind.
When the professional criminal burglarizes a bank,
he acts for his personal gain. When the drug addict
forges a medical prescription, he does so to satisfy
his personal attachment to narcotics. Indeed,
when one who is mentally sick is guided to homicide through ill-conceived delusions, those delusions are symptomatic of his mental illness.

The convictional criminal, on the other hand,
has an altruistic-communal motivation rather
than an egoistic drive. It is not altruistic, however,
in the sense that his regard for the personal interests of specified individuals is the basis of his
action. Homicide as a revenge for another person
mThis was first proposed in Schafer, Juvenile Delin-

quents in "Convictional Crime" 1 INT'L ANNALS OF
CUMHNOLOGY 45-51 (1963).
3 POAL, sura note 5, at 50.
3 See S. ScAFER & R. KNU=N, JUVENILE DEirmQuENcY: AN IN RODUCTION 165-68 (1970).
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or stealing food to feed the family are not convictional crimes, though they were committed for
another's sake. The convictional criminal's altruism is a nonpersonal cmmunal experience, aiming
at some sort of social change. That experience may
be directed at changing the social total, a segment
of it, or just a single social issue related to the
community's governmental, social, moral or religious ideals. His altruism is communal not only
because it may come into conflict with the prevailing power structure, but also because his
violation of the law is intended to legitimate social
ideas through crime, and his deviance contemplates social progress. The legendary hero who
robbed the rich to give to the poor, the suffragette
who agitated for the women's vote to force changes
in the law, the members of the Resistance who
injured others to hamper the invader, and the
counterrevolutionary who killed to crush an opposing ideology all represented altruistic-communal
ideas and ideals. They committed crimes because
they were convinced of the justice of their beliefs
and because crime appeared to them to be the
best available means to express their unselfish
concerns for their social groups.
Magnified by his conviction, the convictional
criminal's ideal looms large, overshadowing his
crime. This conviction does not stem from his
passion, however, for he is not "passionate" unless "passion" can be identified with emotions in
general 3 6 While the convictional criminal does
not discount the implications of crime and punishment, this is not because some passionate outburst
would cloud his consideration. He holds his altruistic-communal belief frigido pacatoque animo,
with a "cool and peaceful mind." This is why he is
able to "convince" himself. If his conviction appears colored with emotion, this can be attributed
to the fact that no moral decision-making is
possible without some sort of emotional involvement, and also to an inner dilemma which he
must resolve before turning to crime.
A genuine convictional criminal cannot escape
this dilemma. He inevitably faces an internal
clash between two antagonistic beliefs which
represent a nearly insoluble and tragic contradiction between moral and social demands. One
belief is his loyalty to the general principles of law
was the term used by older writers when
36'assion"
referring to emotions in general, but it is now reserved
for violent emotional outbreaks. See J. DwREVE, A
DicTIoNARY op PsychoLoGY

199 (1952).

and order and his condemnation of ordinary selfish
crime. The other is his conviction of the justice
of his cause and his assumption that only crime
can promote it. Although he struggles to reconcile
these two contradictory responsibilities and feels
tormented by the conflict between them, the convictional criminal commits his crime out of a sense
of convinced obligation. Because of the power of
his conviction, he cannot refrain from violating
the law, even at the sacrifice of his life, his freedom,
and his loyalty to the rule of law. Although the
legendary hero, may have disapproved of robbery,
he committed the act frequently in favor of the
poor. Though the Resistance member may have
condemned violence, his conviction in his cause
overshadowed any sense of repugnance to engaging in violent crimes to expel the invader from
the fatherland. The counterrevolutionary knew
that homicide was a capital crime, yet he killed for
the good of his nation.
TnE INSmumENTA.=ITY OF

CONvICTIONAL CR=s
The power of his ideal causes the convictional
criminal to commit crime. Since he views crime as
disobedience to the laws of his society and as an
evil deed against law and order, however, his internal conflict does not result from fear of penal
consequences. Although he may show signs of
anxiety and agitation, they are not directly associated with the crime itself. Crime is not his main
purpose but only an act that intervenes between
his convictional decision and the achievement of
his ultimate idea. It is merely a fool which may
lead to similar crimes and eventually to the success of his cause. Consequently, his violation of the
law is not a self-contained behavior, but is an
"instrumental crime" for ideological purposes. The
legendary hero's goal was not robbery but aid to
the poor. Nevertheless, the commission of a crime
puts a temporary end to the convictional criminal's
anxiety. Although he may not yet have realized
his goal, he sees his crime as a necessary step
toward it. His tragic dilemma is resolved for the
time being and his psychic balance is restored
through the force of the conviction that led him to
commit the criminal act. His intellectual response
to his own crime therefore proceeds in a specific
direction.
Since the. ordinary criminal undergoes relatively
minimal internal struggle before committing his

STEPHEN SCHAFER

crime, his anxiety is confined mainly to careful
planning, maintenance of security, and successful
criminal action. The convictional criminal, on the
other hand, is often less concerned with the actual
mechanics of his crime. Although his excitement
may be greater, he seeks a difficult goal that goes
well beyond the crime itself. While the conventional criminal is often restless after the crime has
been committed, because of pangs of conscience,
fear of arrest, and other upsetting conditions, the
convictional criminal's conscience is satisfied and
his previously upset balance is restored.
Since every breach of secrecy may jeopardize his
success, the conventional criminal places great
importance upon security. Planning, preparation,
and the location of his hiding place are kept confidential. He does his best to maintain security
among his accomplices and, to an extent, even
among his victims. Any form of publicity presents
a danger to the ordinary criminal. In contrast, the
convictional criminal, with his altruistic ideology,
not only places less emphasis upon secrecy but
frequently welcomes publicity. He hides and disguises his activities only to promote his communal
goals. Dramatic publicity of the crime is therefore
almost a necessity for the convictional criminal
because it maximizes the public's understanding
of his actions. Jesus, by claiming to be the Christ,
the King of the Jews, was automatically committing treason against Rome, but his doing so attracted millions of followers generation after
generation. Tales of the robberies of the legendary
hero and the dramatic stories of Resistance
members' deeds served to direct attention to the
plight of the poor or to recruit new fighters and
excite the general populace to join the uprising.
Publicity about convictional crimes almost inevitably leads to further crimes. As the convictional
criminal disseminates his ideals to more members
of his society, the number of convictional crimes
tends to increase. His crime may serve as an example to would-be followers. Since the convictional
crime may even be supported by public opinion,
punishment of of the offender may fail to deter
later convictional crimes. Moreover, martyrdom
may serve only to interest others in the given ideal
and to recruit members for other convictional
violations of the law. The acts of the legendary
hero stimulated and encouraged others to overcome their inhibitions and join him in robbing the
rich. As the counterrevolutionaries' fight for freedom touched the consciences of fellow citizens,
they joined in the rebellion.

TiE
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PSEUDO-CONVICTIONAL CRIMINAL

Not all who commit crimes to promote the triumph of an altruistic-communal cause, however,
are genuine convictional criminals. Not all contemplate the justice of the ideal that leads to a
conviction nor are all tormented by the tragic
dilemma of loyalties which is a necessary condition
for becoming a true political criminal. "The activist
is tempted by opportunism, the urge to adjust his
arguments to meet every change in political fortune," and "the scientist faces the danger of losing touch with common political concerns." 7 The
large proportion of "pseudo-convictional" criminals and their skill in hiding their criminal opportunism pose the greatest problems in singling
out the genuinely "convinced" criminal who
deviate only for the idea of social change or an
altruistic-communal issue. Devising an objective
method to detect the genuine political criminal by
examining the functional role of his "conviction"
'could bring us closer to a uniform concept of the
political criminal.
Many pseudo-convictional criminals simply use
the convictional ideal as an excuse for their own
selfish criminal acts. Moved by love of adventure,
psychopathic deviation, justification for avoiding
constructive work or hope of gain, the pseudoconvictional offenders may join forces with the
true convictional criminal and produce the criminality and "immorality of political maxims." 8
Friends of the legendary hero joined him because
of their thirst for adventure. Some followers of the
Resistance saw merely the opportunity to satisfy
their criminal inclinations. Some participants in
counterrevolutionary activities sought only future
or immediate personal gain. These were not genuine
convictional criminals serving an ideal but individuals after selfish, individualistic goals which
they sought to achieve through crime.
Any aggressive idealistic movement is likely to
have both convictional and pseudo-convictional
participants. While the convictional political
criminal has a moral base, the pseudo-convictional
offender corrupts an otherwise honorable dispute
over the pluralistic nature of values. The pseudoconvictional political criminal is dominated by his
personal goals. He uses convictional ideals as an
excuse to steal, rob, or murder or to incite others
to do so. Unlike the young Robespierre, who re7 The Laws Behind Disorder. The Times Literary
Supp., March 19, 1971 at 309.
3 PxoAL, supra note 5, at 1-23.
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signed a judgeship rather than inflict the death
penalty, the pseudo-convictional "politician"
aspires to the chair of a judge even at the price of
inflicting capital punishment. Thus, he appears at
a respectability-level even lower than that of a
pick-pocket or a bankrobber: the latter, at least,
honestly admit their egoistic aims. Also, the
pseudo-convictional offender is more dangerous
than any other criminal type because he victimizes
the collectivity. He is even more dangerous than
the true political criminal because he makes him-

self a public figure and proposes a profound transformation of society without making known his
real goals.
While we always hope to isolate and eliminate
the pseudo-political criminal, he endures among us,
and his increasingly forceful activity often overshadows the ideals of the genuine rnnvictional
criminal. As a result, faith in his ideals may falter
and the concept of the genuine convictional criminal may give rise to its only alternative: the concept of the pseudo-political criminal.

